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THE CORPORATION IN ELECTION LAW
Adam Winkler*
I. INTRODUCTION
The corporation has long played a central role in election law.
Indeed, the Tillman Act of 1907, which barred corporations from
contributing to candidates for federal office,' has been called "the
first federal campaign finance law.",2 Despite this long history, how-
ever, election law has not settled on a single, coherent conception of
the corporation-what it is, what values it serves, and what role it
should play in politics. As a result, election laws regulating corpo-
rate political activity have been based on a variety of divergent and
often inconsistent views of the corporation.
This state of affairs mirrors a similar dilemma in corporate law,
which has variously been described as "schizophrenic"3 and "cha-
otic" 4 for lacking any settled view of what a corporation is and what
place it ought to have in society. In election law, these competing
forces emerge as a tangled web of restrictions, bans, and principles-
some restricting corporate power, others liberating it. Due to the ten-
sions and inconsistencies between the various views of the
* My gratitude goes to Melissa Bomes, Scott Bowman, Rick Hasen, Ken
Karst, Chris May, Karen Orren, and James Zagel for their comments and sug-
gestions.
1. See Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (1994)). The Tillman Act also prohibited federally-chartered
corporatiQns and banks from contributing to any candidate for elective office,
state or federal. See id.
2. ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE
MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW xvii (1988). But see Navy
Appropriations Act, ch. 172, sec. 3, 14 Stat. 492 (1867) (1867 law barring fed-
eral officers from soliciting contributions from Navy yard-workers).
3. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Cor-
poration, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992).
4. DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATIONS vs. THE COURT: PRIvATE POWER,
PUBLIC INTERESTS 79 (1999).
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corporation, none of the laws' goals are fully achieved. The laws
based on one view of the corporation are inhibited by laws based on
other views of the corporation. The purpose of this Article is to
identify the various ways in which election law has conceptualized
the corporation and highlight some of the dilemmas engendered by
this diversity.
There are five basic ways that election law has viewed the cor-
poration. The first and arguably most influential view of the corpo-
ration is the "political equality" view. According to the political
equality view, a corporation is a corrupting force in politics that uses
its wealth to gain unfair advantages over ordinary individuals. We
can see this view in laws justified as measures to equalize, or tone
down, the political voice of corporations.
Election law also manifests two views of the corporation that
revolve around the corporation's status as an "entity." Under the
"artificial entity" view, the corporation is understood to be a creature
of the state, with only those rights granted by the state. In contrast,
the "natural entity" view posits that the corporation is akin to a natu-
ral individual with inherent rights, such as freedom of speech, inde-
pendent of the state. Defining a corporation as either an artificial or
a natural entity has profound effects on whether the corporation has
constitutional rights it can assert to defeat electoral regulation.
Election law's final two views of the corporation understand it
primarily as an association of individuals. When viewed as a "peril-
ous association," the corporation warrants election laws that are de-
signed to protect shareholders and employees who do not wish to
support corporate politics. When viewed as a "salutary association,"
however, the corporation warrants election laws that are structured to
advance the values gained by association through the corporate form.
Each of these views has propelled electoral regulation of the
corporation or figured prominently in election law adjudication and
debate. Because these views are often contradictory and incompati-
ble, however, the body of corporate electoral law is at best problem-
atic and unsatisfactory, with laws designed to achieve one goal un-
dermined by others seeking different objectives. At worst, corporate
election law is internally inconsistent, ineffective, and, in some
cases, constitutionally dubious.
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II. POLITICAL EQUALITY AND THE CORPORATION
Business corporations have long been condemned for exerting
too much influence in government. Such condemnation is a product
of the view that corporations, due to their immense aggregations of
capital, are a profoundly inegalitarian force in politics. This view of
the corporation has been an enduring theme in debates over corporate
politics and has animated seminal electoral reforms. The goal of
laws based on this view is to achieve political equality by limiting
the corporate voice. Nevertheless, I suggest here, reforms based on
this view of the corporation exist in tension with current constitu-
tional doctrine and are ineffective in achieving their goal of political
equality between corporations and ordinary citizens.
The rise of the national railroads and large manufacturing and
industrial firms in the decades following the Civil War led to the
strident anti-corporate rhetoric of the Progressive Era, and the first
wave of corporate electoral reform. Aggregations of wealth were not
only unsettling due to their increasing power over the lives of
Americans who preferred small, parochial republican communities,
5
they were also dominating politics by squeezing out the electoral
voice of the ordinary citizen. Government was increasingly viewed
as controlled by private moneyed interests-corporations, trusts, and
industrialists like Cornelius Vanderbilt who believed and acted as if
"The public be damned!"6 State politics were often directed not by
popular demands, but by those of businesses operating within their
borders. This occurred from New Hampshire-where the Concord
and Boston & Maine Railroads fought over government spoils7 -to
California-where the Southern Pacific Railroad hand-picked the
majority of judges and legislators in the young state.8 The railroads,
according to Republican reformer William E. Chandler, exercised
5. On the unsettling nature of Progressive era changes in American soci-
ety, see ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967); T.J.
JACKSON LEARS, No PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880-1920 (1981).
6. THE DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 436 (E.D. Hirsch, Jr., et al.
eds., 1988) (quoting Cornelius Vanderbilt).
7. See MUTCH, supra note 2, at 4.
8. See Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the
Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1165, 1184 (1998).
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"systemic control" over government, from "the lowest town offices"
to "the executive officers of state and nation."1
9
Turn of the century corporate involvement in politics was par-
ticularly distressing because it was seen as anti-democratic in two
senses: corporations worked against the people's interests and cor-
porations received special treatment. 10 Corporations were not just
constituents making a fair claim to their share of the political pie,
they were usurpers of the individual's right to participate in demo-
cratic governance. Chandler warned, "[W]hen corporations can fur-
nish money to carry elections from corporation treasuries, individu-
alism in government is gone-individual free will and individual
responsibility."" Thus, "[w]hen the custom grows broad enough the
whole character of government is changed, and corporations rule, not
men.' 2 Elected officials were perceived by many to be representa-
tives of industry, not people or regions: it was said that "[o]ne sena-
tor, for instance, represented the Union Pacific Railway System, an-
other the New York Central, still another the insurance interests of
New York and New Jersey."
13
To save democracy from oligarchic capital, electoral reformers
organized to "purify the politics"'14 of American government. On the
federal level, the linchpin of the electoral reform movement was the
Tillman Act of 1907, banning corporate contributions to federal can-
didates and all contributions from federally-chartered corporations.
15
The Tillman Act was justified by many on equality grounds, to re-
strict the corrupting influence of corporations in politics.' 6 Propo-
nents of the bill emphasized the special treatment contributing
9. MUTCH, supra note 2, at 7 (quoting William E. Chandler).
10. According to Richard Hofstadter, the opening of the 20th century wit-
nessed a rapidly spreading fear that "the great business combinations, being the
only centers of wealth and power, would be able to lord it over all other inter-
ests and thus put an end to traditional American democracy." RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 225 (1955).
11. MuTCH, supra note 2, at 176 (quoting William E. Chandler).
12. Id.
13. WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE, MASKS IN A PAGEANT 79 (1928).
14. 41 CONG. REc. 1454 (1907) (statement of Rep. Grosvenor).
15. See Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (1994)).
16. See EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 12 (1968).
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corporations received from the Republican administrations of Wil-
liam McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, such as immunity from an-
titrust prosecutions. 7 In 1896 and 1900, McKinley's financier Mar-
cus Hanna imposed fixed assessments upon corporations as
contributions,' 8 charging them according to their capitalization and
their "stake in the general prosperity."' Standard Oil, the largest
corporation of its day, was required to contribute $250,000 to the
1896 Republican presidential campaign.20  The 1904 Democratic
presidential nominee, Judge Alton Parker, made incumbent Roose-
velt's acceptance of corporate contributions a primary issue of the
election.21 This, coupled with the high-profile Armstrong committee
investigation into the political power of New York's insurance tri-
umvirate-New York, Mutual, and Equitable Life2 2 -led to propos-
als for restraining corporate influence.
Even the beneficiary, Roosevelt, though victorious at the polls in
1904, was shamed into denouncing corporate contributions and
called for their ban the following year.2 3 Congress heeded the call
with the passage of "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman's bill. Although stating
that the "evils" of money in politics were "so generally recognized"
that it was "unnecessary to make any argument," the Senate Report
explained that the corporate contribution ban was "calculated to
promote purity in the selection of public officials." 24 During legisla-
tive debate, one representative described the motivating force to be
"the popular demand of the country that we shall prevent the influ-
ence of corporations." 25 By 1928, that demand had resulted in thirty-
six states enacting kindred legislation regulating corporate campaign
contributions.
26
17. See MUTCH, supra note 2, at 1.
18. See HERBERT CROLY, MARCUS ALONZO HANNA: HIS LIFE AND WORK
220, 325 (1912).
19. GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE? AMERICAN
CAMPAIGN FINANCING PRACTICES FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT 49-50 (1973).
20. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 11.
21. See id.
22. See MUTCH, supra note 2, at 2-3.
23. See EARL R. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES
LEGISLATION 190 (1928).
24. S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (1906).
25. 41 CONG. REC. 1452 (1907) (statement of Rep. Mann).
26. See SIKES, supra note 23, at 127.
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Many of those same states took even more extreme measures to
reform electoral politics in the name of limiting the corporate voice.
One such measure-the popular initiative-became commonplace
between the Spanish-American War and the First World War.27 The
initiative mechanism was specifically designed by populist progres-
sives to curb the political influence of corporations, especially rail-
roads, and enhance the voice of the common person. It was widely
believed throughout the Midwest and West that the only way to
avoid corporate corruption was to take politicians out of the process,
leaving it to the people to decide political issues themselves directly
at the polls. The most profound structural campaign finance reform
ever implemented, the initiative process, was based explicitly on the
argument that corporations dominated politics and needed to be re-
strained in the name of political equality.
The view of the corporation as a profoundly inegalitarian influ-
ence in politics has lingered in American public discourse throughout
the twentieth century. The courts, however, have been hostile to
electoral reforms based on this view. Consider the majority opinion
of former corporate lawyer Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. in First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.29 Massachusetts, in justifying its
ban on corporate spending to influence ballot initiative campaigns,
echoed the equality concerns that had previously led to the adoption
of the Tillman Act and the initiative process itself. Corporations, the
state argued, might "destroy the confidence of the people in the
democratic process... [because they are] wealthy and powerful ag-
gregations of capital whose views may drown out other points of
view."30 Powell's opinion rejected this argument as unproven and
contrary to the neutrality demanded by the First Amendment.
3 1
Perhaps the historical pedigree of Massachusetts's argument
pressured Powell into the bewildering contortions he makes in the
opinion. Initially he appears open to Massachusetts's equality argu-
ment, stating that it "would merit our consideration" if it were
27. See THOMAS E. CRONiN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICs OF
INrrIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 51 (1989).
28. See id. at 43-50.
29. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
30. Id. at 789 (Powell, J., characterizing Massachusetts's argument).
31. See id. at 789-91.
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"supported by record or legislative findings [showing] that the rela-
tive voice of corporations has been overwhelming., 32 In the next
paragraph, however, Powell states that "[t]o be sure, corporate ad-
vertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its
purpose."33 Moreover, the "fact that advocacy may persuade the
electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it."
34
Taking Powell's initial demand for evidence of a dominant cor-
porate voice at face value, the standard creates a nearly insurmount-
able barrier for laws based on political equality concerns. Despite
many thoughtful, research-intensive efforts to show that corporations
exert considerable influence in ballot campaigns,35 the complex web
of factors influencing any election makes satisfying a court of law as
to specific causal relationships unlikely. How can one prove that
voters were overwhelmed by spending, rather than convinced by
substantive arguments, other initiative backers, or the inept adver-
tisements for the other side? So long as this evidentiary hurdle ex-
ists, the courts are bound to frustrate electoral reformers who press
for regulation to limit corporate influence.
Perhaps the corporations most likely to be viewed as having a
significant influence over election results would be media corpora-
tions, and free press concerns may prevent their regulation. Concur-
ring in Bellotti, Chief Justice Warren Burger noted that "media con-
glomerates . . . pose a much more realistic threat [of corporate
domination] than do [ordinary businesses that are] not regularly con-
cerned with shaping popular opinion." 36 Indeed, while the number of
mass media outlets has exploded over the last twenty years, the own-
ership of those outlets has remained concentrated.37 This has
32. Id. at 789.
33. Id. at 790.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propo-
sitions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment,
29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 542-47 (1982); John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy,
Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and
Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 391-406
(1985).
36. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 796-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37. See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 133, 186
(1998).
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heightened the power Burger noted as being "in few hands."38 Not
only can media corporations be tainted in their coverage of politics
by the common corporate concern for shareholder value, media cor-
porations are the only ones lawfully allowed to publicly endorse can-
didates.39 Though some have challenged this media exception,40
most liberal reformers would likely agree with Justice Thurgood
Marshall's suggestion in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce41 that media exceptions are constitutionally justifiable.42 If so,
politics and public debate could still be dominated by corporate enti-
ties no matter what equality-based reform election law adopts.
To the extent corporate electoral reforms are based on equality
concerns, they run afoul of settled constitutional doctrine. As the per
curiam opinion in Buckley v. Valeo explained, "the concept that gov-
emnment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment." 43 Perhaps. Nonetheless, as the initiative process
and the Tillman Act44 indicate, toning down the political voice of
corporations in the name of equality is not foreign to election law.
So long as Buckley remains good law, equality-based election laws
regulating the corporation, such as the corporate contribution ban and
the initiative process, will exist in tension with controlling constitu-
tional doctrine. 
45
Not only do election laws based on a political equality view of
the corporation run counter to current constitutional doctrine, they
38. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 797 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
39. See Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Mur-
doch Problem, 77 Tsx. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999).
40. See id.
41. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
42. See id. at 667-68.
43. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
44. The Court implicitly upheld the ban on corporate contributions in Fed-
eral Election Comm 'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-10
(1982).
45. Justice Powell finessed this tension in Bellotti, suggesting that the con-
tribution ban might be justified by the governmental interest in preventing the
"corruption of elected representatives through the creation of political debts."
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26. If, as Buckley suggests, the potential for quid
pro quo corruption arises from large campaign contributions, then the complete
ban on corporate contributions is vastly over-inclusive. See Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 26-29 (per curiam).
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have been remarkably ineffective. Neither ballot initiatives nor con-
tribution bans have purified politics from corporate influence. Cor-
porations often play an active and influential role in ballot initiatives
by promoting or opposing ballot measures through advertising, direct
mail, and interest group funding. 46 Since the 1970s, corporations
have successfully financed ballot campaigns on initiatives involving
environmental controls, nuclear power, tobacco taxes, and mandatory
bottle returns--often vastly outspending their opponents by margins
as great as thirty-five to one.47 This continuing corporate influence
has spurred a new round of initiative reform, with states such as
Montana enacting prohibitions on corporate ballot campaign expen-
ditures.48 Such prohibitions, however, are of questionable constitu-
tional validity in light of Bellotti's forceful protection of corporate
speech in the initiative process.
Many legislators who supported the corporate contribution ban
in 1907 would not be surprised by the law's ineffectiveness. "I shall
vote for it," declared one representative in the floor debate, but "no
good will come of this legislation. It does not go far enough. 49
Roosevelt warned of the danger that the law would "be obeyed only
by the honest, and disobeyed by the unscrupulous." 50 Politically ac-
tive corporate executives, in contrast, viewed the contribution ban as
"something like the Prohibition Act, which turned a reasonable ac-
tivity into a crime."5' Indeed, like prohibition, the contribution ban
has been ineffective, driving activity underground. One particularly
frank executive admitted to Fortune magazine in 1956 that "[a] lot of
corporation presidents just reach in the till and get $25,000 to
contribute to political campaigns,, 52 covering up the contributions
46. See Winkler, supra note 37, at 139.
47. See Allen K. Easley, Buying Back the First Amendment: Regulation of
Disproportionate Corporate Spending in Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17 GA. L.
REv. 675, 686-94 (1983); David R. Lagasse, Note, Undue Influence: Corpo-
rate Political Speech, Power, and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
1347, 1378-95 (1995).
48. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-236 (1997).
49. 41 CoNG. REC. 1454 (1907) (statement of Rep. Grosvenor).
50. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 59.
51. Duncan Norton-Taylor, How to Give Money to Politicians, FORTUNE,
May 1956, at 113, 238.
52. Id.
1251
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1243
through creative record-keeping and expecting restitution come bo-
nus time.
5 3
By the time of Watergate, few doubted Orin E. Atkin's observa-
tion that corporate violation of the ban was widespread.54 Edwin Ep-
stein described the history of the Tillman Act as "marked by consti-
tutional uncertainty, statutory ambiguity, judicial limitations,
administrative nonenforcement, and corporate violation." 55 It is no
surprise, therefore, that the result of the ban has been not to solve the
problem of corporate wealth in election campaigns, but to help ob-
scure its influence.
56
Other areas of corporate election law have opened up loopholes
enabling corporations to exert electoral influence and inhibiting the
attainment of political equality. Corporations seeking to influence
candidates, for example, can give unlimited amounts of unregulated
"soft money" contributions to party committees. 57 Evoking a famil-
iar rhetorical conflict, Wisconsin's reformist Senator Russell Fein-
gold writes that soft money transforms our representative democracy
into a "corporate democracy" in which political influence is tied to
wealth.58 A system based on wealth advantages corporations, which
are granted by law "special advantages-such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation of as-
sets-that enhance their ability to attract capital." 59 As a result, cor-
porations are particularly well-equipped to influence politics.
Moreover, under federal election law, corporations can form political
action committees ("PACs")60 and the PAC explosion of the 1970s
53. See id.
54. See MUTCH, supra note 2, at 166.
55. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 90.
56. See id.
57. The term "soft money" refers to "any political contribution that is not
subject to federal law.... The only limitation on soft money is that it cannot
(legally) be used explicitly to advocate the election of a specific candidate."
DAN CLAWSON ET AL., DOLLARS AND VOTES: How BUSINESS CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS SUBVERT DEMOCRACY 107 (1998).
58. See Senator Russell Feingold, Representative Democracy Versus Cor-
porate Democracy: How Soft Money Erodes the Principle of "One Person,
One Vote, " 35 HARV. J. LEGIS. 377, 378-82 (1998).
59. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990).
60. See infra Part IV (explaining PACs, the development of which is more
1252
June 1999] THE CORPORATION IN ELECTION LAW
and 1980s broadened the avenues for corporate influence through
candidate contributions. 6 1 By contributing to candidates through
PACs, corporations buy access to elected officials, purchasing not
votes but sympathetic ears in times of need6 2 -ears unavailable to
most constituents. Not surprisingly, corporate PACs are condemned
by critics for undermining the democratic process, pursuing special
narrow interests at the expense of the public interest, and drowning
out the voices of ordinary individuals.
63
It may be that attempts to restrain corporate influence through
electoral reform are futile. The organization of the broader political
system insures that corporations will remain powerful forces in leg-
islatures and regulatory agencies. Funded directly by their treasuries,
corporations do extensive legislative lobbying to shape laws.
Moreover, the modem administrative state, with its revolving doors
between government and industry, means that the regulators and the
regulated are often the same people, or share a common background.
Equalizing the corporate voice is a daunting, if not impossible, task.
III. ENTITY VIEWS OF THE CORPORATION
Election law debates demonstrate two views of the corporation
as an entity. Under these views, the corporation is an identifiable
being, distinct from its shareholders and employees. What separates
the two entity views is how they frame the relationship between the
corporate entity and the state. The corporation is sometimes viewed
as an artificial entity, created by the state and having only those
rights granted in its corporate charter. At other times, the corpora-
tion is viewed as a natural entity, akin to an individual with inherent
rights not dependent on the state. Each of these views is, however,
problematic; their coexistence breeds instability into election law.
consistent with an association view of the corporation).
61. The number of PACs grew from 89 in 1974 to 1,682 in 1984. See
THEODORE J. EISMEIER & PHILIP H. POLLOCK III, BusINEss, MONEY, AND
THE RISE OF CORPORATE PACs IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 101 (1988).
62. See generally CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 57, 63-106 (arguing that
corporate PACs secure access to politicians and, thus, influence legislation).
63. See AMITAI ETzIONI, CAPITAL CORRUPTION 39-41 (1984).
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A. The Corporation as an Artificial Entity
In the early nineteenth century, the corporation was considered
an artificial entity because it "owed its existence to the positive law
of the state rather than the private initiative of individual incorpora-
tors." 64 As Chief Justice John Marshall explained in Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, "[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisi-
ble, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as inci-
dental to its very existence."
65
The artificial entity view arose out of the basic legal structure of
the corporation. Historically, every corporation was individually
created by a special legislative charter, 66 gained through a process of
lobbying, debate, and influence-peddling in the manner of other
types of legislation. Because charters were special contracts with the
state, they were strictly construed to limit corporate powers to more
or less explicit grants of state-recognized power. The courts used the
ultra vires doctrine to invalidate corporate activity beyond the scope
of the charter. 67 Corporations "were legally privileged organiza-
tions" warranting close supervision to ensure their objectives were
"consistent with public welfare."
68
Twentieth century debates about corporate political participation
are colored by the artificial entity view. For example, the artificial
entity view was reflected in arguments about the Tillman Act. All
corporations were prohibited from contributing to federal candidates;
however, the proposed legislation would bar those with federal, as
opposed to state, charters from contributing to any candidate for
elective office. 69 Legislators insisted that the broader prohibition on
political involvement by federally-chartered corporations was
64. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206.
65. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 636 (1819).
66. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188-89,
194-95 (2d ed. 1985); J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 33-34 (1970).
67. See MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960 77-78 (1992).
68. RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION 1784-1855 5 (1982).
69. See 41 CONG. REC. 1453 (1907) (statement of Rep. Hardwick).
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justifiable because "[w]e can regulate the terms under which corpo-
rations of that character can live and move and have their being.
' 7 °
Regulation of all corporations was necessary because they, like
the "Frankenstein monster" that Justice Louis Brandeis envisioned,
were turning on their creators by becoming politically active.71 The
views expressed by the New York Tribune in 1905 were widely
shared:
A corporation is not a citizen .... It is an artificial crea-
tion, brought into existence by favor of the state solely to
perform the functions allowed by its charter. Interference
by it with the state and attempts by it to exercise rights of
citizenship are fundamentally a perversion of its power.
72
States attempted to prevent such perversion by arguing that use
of corporate funds to make political contributions was ultra vires.
For example, in the 1904 case of McConnell v. Combination Mining
& Milling Co.,73 the Supreme Court of Montana held that the mining
company's contribution to advance the silver cause was "clearly out-
side of the purposes for which the corporation was created" because
the contribution was made for "strictly political purposes." 74 The
contributions that the Republican National Committee received from
the New York Insurance Company also occasioned an ultra vires
prosecution in People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss. 75 According to the
New York Court of Appeals, "[t]he company had not the right under
the law of its existence, to agree to make contributions for political
campaigns, any more than to agree to do other things foreign to its
charter.,
76
Although the ultra vires doctrine has withered away to near ir-
relevance and no longer provides a basis for banning corporate
70. Id. See also S. REP. No. 59-3056, at 2 (1906) ("The Congress has the
undoubted right thus to restrict and regulate corporations of its own creation.").
71. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72. MUTCH, supra note 2, at 177 (quoting the New York Tribune from Sep-
tember 18, 1905, at page 6).
73. 76 P. 194 (Mont. 1904).
74. Id. at 199.
75. 80 N.E. 383 (N.Y. 1907).
76. Id. at 387. While no criminal liability was found because the court
found no criminal intent or inherent immorality, the court did suggest that the
payments made gave rise to aprivate wrong. See id.
June 1999] 1255
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political expenditures, the artificial entity view continues to emerge
in election law debates. Perhaps the most ardent supporter of the ar-
tificial entity view is Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. Rehnquist
argues that a corporation has no inherent right to participate in poli-
tics but has only those rights that are granted by the state or "inci-
dental to its very existence."77 Hence,
when a State creates a corporation with the power to ac-
quire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly
guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that
property absent due process of law. Likewise, when a State
charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a news-
paper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled
to liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its busi-
ness.
78
Rather than propose a categorical rule, Rehnquist would base the
determination of which rights a corporation holds on the context of
the particular corporation's business as understood by the state that
created it. Those who believe that media corporations, such as the
New York Times, ought to have broader First Amendment rights than
non-media corporations, such as Exxon, might welcome Rehnquist's
approach because it provides a constitutional--or at least theoreti-
cal-basis for the creation of media exceptions to corporate electoral
regulations.
Nevertheless, Rehnquist's approach would be difficult to apply
in practice. Determining which rights are "incidental" to a corpora-
tion's existence is no simple, mechanical task. Rehnquist's ambigu-
ous standard is likely to result in inconsistent interpretations of which
rights particular types of corporations hold. Some courts might even
hold that any activity that furthers corporate business interests is in-
cidental to incorporation. Even if applied consistently, the Rehnquist
approach might grant media corporations too much influence, al-
lowing them to occupy the field of corporate political activity un-
challenged. Additionally, it may be nearly impossible to determine
which rights are incidental to corporations with multiple business
77. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 517, 636 (1819)).
78. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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operations and units. Indeed, few major corporations have only a
single business. 79 Moreover, the structure of corporate law encour-
ages corporations to have multiple business objectives. General in-
corporation laws, which replaced special chartering as the norm for
incorporation in the last decades of the nineteenth century, allow in-
corporation for any lawful purpose.8 0 A corporation formed for any
lawful purpose could plausibly claim that political speech rights are
incidental to whatever lawful purposes its incorporators can imagine.
B. The Corporation as a Natural Entity
According to the natural entity view, the corporation is a crea-
ture of private initiative, not of the state.81 Under this view, the state
serves merely as a facilitator for incorporators' pursuit of profit. As
a natural entity, the corporation, like an individual, has a spectrum of
inherent rights the existence of which owes nothing to the state.
8 2
The Waite Court more or less formally adopted the natural en-
tity view of the corporation in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pa-
cific Railroad3 in 1886. In a two-sentence discussion, the Court
held that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment8 4 and thereby provided the doctrinal foundation
for the extension of numerous constitutional rights to corporate enti-
ties.8 5 The doctrinal equation of a corporation with individuals con-
ceptually unmoored the once artificial corporation from the state that
created it. The corporation became a holder of Lockean natural and
inalienable rights increasingly immune from state infringement.
The natural entity view was adopted by Republican opponents to
the Tillman Act. One congressman reasoned, "There is no more rea-
son why a corporation should not contribute to political campaign
funds than there is why an individual should not, and the same rule
79. See SCIULLI, supra note 4, at 149 (noting that as early as 1969, a mere
seven percent of major U.S. corporations had only a single business).
80. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (1991).
81. See Millon, supra note 64, at 211.
82. See id. at 211-14 (discussing the United States Supreme Court holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects corporations).
83. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
84. See id. at 396.
85. On the constitutional rights held by corporations, see Winkler, supra
note 37, at 195 n.269.
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ought to be enforced against the individual as against the corpora-
tion., 8 6 Another reasoned, "A corporation... is just as much an in-
dividual as is a man, and Congress has just as much power over that
individual, over all individuals, as it has over that corporation.
' 87
While the Fifty-ninth Congress disagreed and passed the Tillman
Act, election law would eventually evolve somewhat in the direction
desired by the Republicans.
Just as the Santa Clara Court accepted the corporation as a
rights-holder without substantive argument, 8 courts have also al-
lowed corporate First Amendment rights to emerge doctrinally with-
out much thoughtful discussion. The first challenge to the Tillman
Act, which occurred in United States v. United States Brewers'Asso-
ciation,89 set the tone. Criminally indicted for violating the contri-
bution ban, several Pennsylvania and New York brewing companies
argued that the law infringed on their inherent speech rights.9 The
court upheld the law but ducked the question of corporations as
rights-bearers. Refusing to state whether corporations have First
Amendment rights, the court ruled instead that the ban "neither pre-
vents, nor purports to prohibit, the freedom of speech or of the
press." 91 Therefore, the court did not need to determine if corpora-
tions had the inalienable right of free speech.
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue directly in Bel-
lotti.92 Commentators who have argued that Bellotti reflects a natu-
ral entity view of the corporation 93 are only half-right. The opinion,
penned by Justice Powell, granted the corporation broad speech pro-
tection as if it were a natural rights holder, but carefully avoided
giving explicit recognition of the natural entity view. In fact, Powell
86. 41 CONG. REc. 1452 (1907) (statement of Rep. Mann).
87. Id. at 1454 (statement of Rep. Grosvenor).
88. See Santa Clara County v. Southem Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886).
89. 239 F. 163 (W.D. Penn. 1916).
90. See id. at 165-66.
91. Id. at 169.
92. 435 U.S. 765 (1977).
93. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Contract Versus Politics in Corporation
Doctrine, in THE POLMCS OF LAW 387, 389-90, (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1990) (arguing that Bellotti reflects a naive view of the corporation that is es-
sentially the same as the natural entity view).
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did not say very much at all about the corporation as such, resting the
protection on two other factors: one, previous case law had protected
the speech rights of media companiesa--even though in none of the
cases had the corporate identity of the speaker been raised as an is-
sue; and two, the public had an interest in the free flow of informa-
tion, regardless of the speaker's identity.95 By emphasizing these
factors and ignoring the corporate identity of the speaker, Powell
rendered the corporate entity invisible while at the same time for-
malizing its equal rights. Since Bellotti, the Court has generally as-
sumed corporations to have First Amendment speech rights akin to
individuals.
96
Election law debates over the application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to the corporate form reflect the interplay of the
artificial and natural entity views of the corporation. Justice Antonin
Scalia and others have contended that corporate electoral speech
rights cannot be restricted on the basis that corporations enjoy state-
conferred advantages.97 Accepting the natural entity view, they ar-
gue that corporations enjoy full First Amendment speech protections
and it would be unconstitutional for a state to require a corporation to
forfeit those rights to gain the state-conferred benefits that come with
incorporation. Whereas adherents of the artificial entity view, such
as Rehnquist, would accept electoral regulation limiting corporate
political speech as a condition of doing business, natural entity pro-
ponents would invalidate those regulations as unconstitutional con-
ditions on the exercise of speech.
While I do not attempt here to sort out the bedeviling nuances of
the "wonderfully inconsistent" unconstitutional conditions doctrine,98
rejecting electoral regulation of the corporation on unconstitutional
94. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 797-98.
95. See id. at 801-02.
96. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
666 (1990) (holding that a state ban on corporate expenditures was an in-
fringement of chamber of commerce's free speech rights, but one that could be
justified and upheld under strict scrutiny).
97. See id. at 679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gerald G. Ashdown, Control-
ling Campaign Spending and the "New Corruption ": Waiting for the Court, 44
VAND. L. REV. 767, 787 (1991).
98. Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Pow-
ers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 374 (1995).
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conditions grounds is inconsistent with other conditions imposed on
rights of electoral participation. For example, non-profit organiza-
tions waive their First Amendment right to engage in political activ-
ity in exchange for governmental benefits in the form of tax exemp-
tions." Similarly, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund 00
conditions public financing for presidential candidates on the accep-
tance of expenditure limits-a direct infringement of free speech.
Lobbying restrictions also mandate the forfeiture of constitutional
rights, forbidding, for example, government employees from lobby-
ing-an exercise of their constitutional right to petition-for a time
after they leave office. Conditioned rights permeate the law of the
political process, not merely electoral regulation of the corporation.
IV. ASSOCIATION VIEWS OF THE CORPORATION
In the latter half of the twentieth century, electoral regulation of
the corporation has often reflected understandings of the corporate
form as an association. Laws that look to the internal organization of
corporations, such as those that distinguish among shareholders,
management, and employees in their ability to use the corporate form
for political purposes, belong within the category of association-
based electoral regulation. There are two categories of association
views manifested in election laws: one that sees corporate associa-
tion as perilous to its members, and one that sees it as salutary to its
members. In this section, I identify these variants of the association
view in electoral regulation and show how they compete with each
other, undermining the coherence and efficacy of association-based
corporate election law.
A. The Corporation as a Perilous Association
The separation of ownership of a corporation and control of its
assets' gave rise to the perilous association view of the corporation.
99. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
100. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (1994).
101. Bit see Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F.
Supp. 280, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (holding that the
Fund does not impose an unconstitutional condition).
102. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (famously discussing the sepa-
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Under the perilous association view, the corporation presents a num-
ber of dangers, foremost among them the problem of agency costs.
Corporate managers may act at the expense of shareholder profits,
using other people's money to pursue managers' own ends. Thus,
one group of corporate "members," the managers, poses the threat of
misusing the capital invested by another group, the stockholders.
Borrowing the principles of fiduciary duty from the common law of
trusts, I1 3 corporate law responded to this agency dilemma by adopt-
ing limits on managerial self-dealing, prohibitions on waste of corpo-
rate resources, and measures to insure efficient restrained manage-
ment.
The perilous association view is reflected in election laws de-
signed to protect members of the corporation to whom the political
activity of the corporation may pose harm, such as stockholders who
do not wish to finance corporate political activities. The concern for
dissenting shareholders is the rationale that "probably fits the present
federal regulatory scheme better than any other.''
1 4
Nevertheless, the courts have traditionally given the dissenting
shareholder view short shrift. In Cort v. Ash, 0 5 shareholders sued
the directors of Bethlehem Steel for funding political advertisements
allegedly in contravention of the corporate contribution ban. Justice
William Brennan, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, complained
that "protection of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary
concern' 0 6 behind the Tillman Act and its subsequent recodifica-
tions. In United States v. CIO,'1 7 Justice Wiley Rutledge derisively
described shareholder protection as "majority prohibition."'1 8 In
Bellotti, Justice Powell also rejected the dissenting shareholder ra-
tionale as a basis for electoral limits on corporate spending.
10 9
ration of ownership and control in public stock corporations).
103. See SCIULLI, supra note 4, at 92-93.
104. Marlene Arnold Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Re-
strictions on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures,
65 CORNELL L. REv. 945, 999 (1980).
105. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
106. Id. at 81.
107. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
108. Id. at 147 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
109. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978).
The lone exception to this trend of discounting the protection of dissenting
shareholders as a valid concern is a case upholding section 54(1) of the Michi-
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As a matter of history, the Court was clearly wrong in stating
that protection of dissenting shareholders was at best a secondary
concern to the Tillman Act. For example, President Roosevelt's
statement to Congress requesting passage of the Tillman Act promi-
nently emphasized the perilous association view: "All contributions
by corporations to any political committee or for any political pur-
pose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to
use stockholder's money for such purposes." 110 Also, in legislative
debates over the Act, Democrats called for the Republicans who had
accepted contributions from New York insurance companies to "re-
fund to the widows and orphans the money of which the trustees of
insurance companies robbed them during the last campaign." ''
Such funds, they insisted, were "diverted and misappropriated" from
policy holders and "misused" for "illegitimate political expendi-
ture." 112 To adherents of the perilous association view, corporate
contributions were "wholly unjustifiable" means by which "execu-
tive officers ... sought to impose their political views upon a con-
stituency of divergent convictions.
' 113
The perilous association view helps to explain the segregated
fund rules for corporate electoral spending. When Congress recodi-
fled the corporate contribution ban in 1971, it included important as-
sociation-based modifications. For the first time, federal law explic-
itly allowed corporations to establish separate segregated funds to
contribute to candidates and finance independent expenditures in
connection with federal elections. These funds, known as PACs, are
created by corporate management and bear the corporation's name.
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") amendments
adopted in 1976, the corporation pays for general administrative and
fund-raising expenses with general treasury funds whereas the politi-
cal expenditures and contributions made by the PAC are funded by
voluntary contributions solicited from a restricted class of people
gan Campaign Finance Act which prohibited corporations from using corpo-
rate treasury funds for independent expenditures for candidates in state elec-
tions. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
110. SIKES, supra note 23, at 190.
111. 41 CONG. REc. 1452-53 (1907) (statement of Rep. Williams).
112. Id. at 1452 (statement of Rep. Williams).
113. SIKES, supra note 23, at 110.
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associated with the corporation. 114 The restricted class is limited to
shareholders, executive and administrative personnel, employees-
although here there are additional limits-and their families.
115
It was the dissenting shareholder rationale that inspired the Su-
preme Court's most dramatic approval of corporate electoral restric-
tions in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.116 In upholding
a state law requirement that corporations and corporate-funded enti-
ties-such as the Chamber of Commerce-use only voluntary PAC
funds to finance public endorsements of candidates in state elections,
Austin articulated a notion of corruption as the political conversion of
other people's money. 117  According to Austin, government has a
compelling interest in preventing this form of corruption peculiar to
the corporate form." 8 In so doing, the Court gave constitutional
status to the perilous association view of the corporation.
This view of the corporation is flexible enough to distinguish
between ideological and business corporations. Non-profit corpora-
tions formed for ideological purposes enjoy greater freedom in elec-
toral activity because people join such corporations out of ideologi-
cal camaraderie to pursue shared political ends. There is generally
no reason to suspect that the ideological non-profit corporation's fi-
nancial supporters dissent from the corporation's political agenda.
1 19
Laws designed to protect dissenting shareholders of business
corporations should, unlike current election law, distinguish between
large, publicly-traded business corporations and closely-held busi-
ness corporations. It is altogether conceivable that closely-held busi-
ness corporations often will have no shareholders who oppose their
political expenditures. To the extent that protecting dissenting
114. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1994).
115. See id. § 441b(b)(4).
116. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Some commentators read Austin to reflect pri-
marily a concern for political equality. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting
Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105,
108-11; Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitar-
ian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1, 41 (1996).
117. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
118. See id.
119. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 243-45 (1986).
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shareholders is the goal of the perilous association-based laws, these
laws should provide exceptions to corporations that can show
unanimous shareholder consent for their political activity. 20
The dissenting shareholder rationale is not without its critics.'
One common criticism is that electoral regulation is not necessary
because dissenting shareholders have adequate means of registering
their objection to corporate political activity through standard corpo-
rate law or by availing themselves of the market for shares. Dis-
senting shareholders, the argument goes, can object by selling their
shares, pursuing reforms through the mechanisms of corporate de-
mocracy, or suing management for waste of corporate resources.
Stern v. General Electric Co.12 2 illustrates that the traditional
corporate law remedies provide little protection for aggrieved share-
holders. In Stern, General Electric ("GE") shareholders tried to force
a vote on a shareholder proposal to require the company to disclose
its PAC contributions. 12- Yet, as has long been recognized, share-
holder proposals rarely work to restrain management because most
shareholders eligible to vote are passive and rationally apathetic.
12 4
Here, GE refused to allow a vote on the proposal. 12  Dissenting
shareholders then filed a derivative suit against management for
wasting corporate assets. 126 To support their claim of waste, share-
holders complained that the GE PAC contributed to congressional
incumbents without regard for the candidates' positions on business
issues, to unopposed candidates, and even to both candidates in a
single contest. 12 7 Yet to get beyond the summary judgment phase,
the shareholders had to show that the corporation received absolutely
no benefit from the political expenditures, which they were unable to
120. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95.
121. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign
Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 406-
13 (1992) (criticizing the dissenting shareholder rationale).
122. 924 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. See Stem v. General Electric Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
124. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1161, 1171 (1981) ("Most shareholders are passive investors seeking liquid
holdings.").
125. See Stem, 837 F. Supp. at 75.
126. See id.
127. See Stem v. General Electric Co., 924 F.2d 472, 473 (2d Cir. 1991).
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do. 128 Indeed, it is hard to imagine any case in which shareholders
could prove no benefit whatsoever from contributions; management
could justify almost any contribution as an attempt to open a candi-
date's eyes to corporate needs. Due to the unbridled discretion em-
bodied in the business judgment rule, derivative suits by dissenting
shareholders, such as GE's, are destined to fail.
Certainly the most vexing question raised by election laws con-
cerning dissenting shareholders is why should they protect those who
dissent from corporate contributions to candidates, but not from cor-
porate political lobbying or other political expenditures. 129 To the
extent protecting shareholders is the goal of the perilous association
view, many current electoral regulations work against achieving that
objective. Corporations are allowed to use shareholder funds to cre-
ate and administer corporate PACs, 3 ° and make unregulated and un-
limited soft money contributions to the national political parties from
'their general treasuries.'1 Because no laws prevent corporations
from financing ordinary political activities, such as speech or lobby-
ing on issues of the day, with shareholder money, shareholders, even
dissenting ones, continue to subsidize corporate politics.
The FECA also provides a measure of protection for another
group whose association with the corporation creates dangers of
abuse: employees. Employees are vulnerable to coercive solicitation
of political contributions by management. While management is
lawfully allowed to solicit employees to make PAC contributions, §
441b establishes a web of rules to protect employees from manage-
rial coercion. For example, § 441b makes it unlawful for a corporate
PAC to use money secured by "job discrimination" or "financial re-
prisal."'132 It further requires that solicited employees be informed of
the "political purposes" of the fund and of their right to refuse to
contribute to it.133 Corporate PACs can only solicit employee contri-
butions twice a year, 34 thereby limiting the opportunities for
128. See Stern, 837 F. Supp. at 73, 76-77.
129. For responses to this question, see Winkler, supra note 37, at 168-71;
Nicholson, supra note 104, at 985-86.
130. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1994); 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(a)(2)(iii).
131. See CLAWSONETAL., supra note 57, at 108.
132. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(A) (1994).
133. Id. § 441b(b)(3)(B)-(C).
134. See id. § 44lb(b)(4)(B).
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harassment. The law requires that all employee solicitations be in
writing and be delivered by mail to the employee's residence, 135 re-
flecting the common sense notion that personal solicitations are more
coercive than written solicitations. In addition, the corporate PACs
must implement safeguards to insure that management cannot deter-
mine which employees decline to contribute amounts of less than
fifty dollars.136 However, the FECA regime does not prevent corpo-
rate coercion of executive and administrative personnel, who do not
enjoy the same safeguards as employees, 137 and thus remain poten-
tial victims of their perilous association with the corporation.
B. The Corporation as a Salutary Association
Competing with the perilous view, the salutary view conceives
of the corporate association as beneficial to its members. There are
two variants of the salutary view in election law. The first envisions
the corporation as a benefit-inducing "nexus of contracts" among
stockholders, management, employees, suppliers, creditors, and
customers. 138 The second envisions the incorporators as using the
organizational form to achieve self-fulfillment. 139 Thus, those who
share the salutary association view of the corporation see the corpo-
ration as providing opportunities for personal or economic enrich-
ment, rather than dangers or threats of abuse, and expect managers
and shareholders to work together in pursuit of common or at least
compatible goals with little need for state regulation.
1. Contract-based salutary association
The view of the corporation as a salutary contractual association
is grounded in neoclassical economics. 40 According to this view, a
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. § 441b(b)(4)(A)-(B).
138. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
311 (1976).
139. See, e.g., Susan L. Ross, Corporate Speech on Political Issues: The
First Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals?, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv.
445, 461 n.130 ("Specific corporations designed for political purposes serve
the self-fulfillment needs of the incorporators and contributors.").
140. See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RMiBsTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND
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corporation is the sum of different inputs, such as shareholders, em-
ployees, managers, suppliers, customers, and creditors, who join the
enterprise through contractual relationships.14 ' This view accepts the
voluntary decision to join this web of contracts as advancing the self-
interest of the signatories. Voluntary signatories to the corporate
contract do not need the protective paternalism of state regulation.
142
Some signatories, such as suppliers and lenders, are capable of pro-
tecting themselves from disfavored managerial activity through ne-
gotiation and detailed written contracts. Shareholders, though lack-
ing detailed contracts, can vote to establish limits on corporate
politics or sell their shares freely.
143
Under the contractual association view of the corporation, ra-
tional contractors can be expected to vote or use detailed contracts to
restrict corporate politics up to the point at which the costs of restric-
tion exceed its benefits. 144 If management's politics damage the cor-
poration or are disfavored by society, the stock market will discipline
management by devaluing the corporation's stock and encouraging a
takeover.145 Electoral regulation is therefore costly, inefficient, and
unnecessary.
146
Elements of the contractual view of the corporation are evident
in Bellotti and in the Austin dissent. In Bellotti, Justice Powell re-
jected the state's justification of the ban on corporate initiative ex-
penditures as an effort to protect dissenting shareholders. 147 Ac-
cording to Powell, "shareholders normally are presumed competent
to protect their own interests."'148 Dissenting in Austin, Justice An-
thony Kennedy declared that a shareholder dissatisfied with corpo-
rate politics can "cease to associate with the group."'149 In his own
THE CONSTITUTION 2-12 (1995); see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)
(discussing the "nexus of contracts" theory).
141. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 140, at 4-7.
142. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 140, at 25-27.
143. See id. at 64-65 (describing shareholders' ability to exit corporation).
144. See id. at 64.
145. See id. at 8 (discussing market discipline on managers).
146. See id. at 66.
147. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
148. Id.
149. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 710 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Austin dissent, Justice Scalia suggested that a dissenting shareholder
unhappy with corporate politics should just "sell his stock."'
150
The contractual view of the corporate association exaggerates
stockholders' freedom to sell their shares. Over half the available
equity in American corporations is held by institutional investors
such as pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies. 151 A
large number of the individuals whose money is invested in corpora-
tions through these institutional investors have little, if any, ability to
control in which companies their money is invested. 152  Selling
shares is therefore considerably more difficult for dissenting share-
holders than the contractualists assume.
The difficulty most shareholders face in selling their shares
points to a larger criticism of the contractualists' theory that the mar-
ket will discipline managers. Corporate funding of PACs and politi-
cal speech expenditures is relatively cheap-so cheap that it evades
the scrutiny of the market. PAC expenses and ballot initiative ad-
vertising represent only a minuscule fraction of a percent of annual
earnings for most publicly-traded corporations. Since market valua-
tion of shares is routinely based on a multiple of corporate earnings,
the impact of such spending on the corporate share price is insignifi-
cant. Because each shareholder's contribution is so minute, they
have little incentive to monitor corporate political spending. Even
the diligent investor will not find basic information about corporate
politics in the marketplace because corporations are not required to
disclose details about what expenditures were made in favor of
which causes or candidates.
2. Constitutive salutary association
The constitutive variant of the salutary association view is based
on the idea that corporations are intermediary institutions, akin to
political parties or interest groups, that allow people to join together
to pursue common, self-fulfilling ends. According to proponents of
this view, "the corporate form performs an important democratic
150. Id. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. See Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and
Institutional Investment: Some Lessons From The Robber-Barons, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 977, 977 (1993).
152. See Winkler, supra note 37, at 167.
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function in facilitating the personal self-realization of the individuals
who have made the voluntary choice to make use of it.' 153 As a re-
sult, "one should view the corporation as merely one form of volun-
tary association, an aggregation of talent and resources, consciously
entered into by individuals ... seeking to self-realize by engaging
and investing in business.'
154
A constitutive view is consistent with election laws that provide
avenues for meaningful, non-coercive political association between
shareholders and management in the corporate name. The FECA
PAC rules enable a restricted class of people associated with the cor-
poration to organize under the corporate name to pursue common
political ends. The FECA rules allow members of the class, who
might find the opportunity empowering, to join a corporate PAC.
The FECA also exempts from the ban on corporate endorsements of
candidates internal political communication to the restricted class,
providing this group greater opportunity than non-members to share
political ideas and coordinate with the corporation.
Corporate PACs are justified on constitutive grounds. Support-
ers claim that PACs are "voluntary membership organizations"'
155
similar to "political parties, interest groups, and.., other associa-
tions.' 156 They "represent individuals who share a common set of
beliefs and values and can find greater individual expression together
through collective action."'157 According to the constitutive view,
corporate PACs are a means of fostering personnel and employee
political participation.1
58
Political scientists have cast some doubt on this description of
corporate PAC contributors. A study of 1980 PAC contributors con-
cluded that PAC contributors showed little relative political com-
mitment or engagement and were less likely to vote than individuals
153. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General
Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 235, 237 (1998). Accord Ross, supra note 139, at 461 n.130.
154. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 153, at 254.
155. Lee Ann Elliot, Political Action Committees: Precincts of the '80s, 22
ARrz. L. REV. 539, 540 (1980).
156. EIsMEIER& POLLOCK, supra note 61, at 13.
157. ANN B. MATASAR, CORPORATE PACs AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCING LAWS 4 (1986).
158. See Elliot, supra note 155, at 547-48.
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who contribute directly to candidates.15 9 Furthermore, some corpo-
rate PACs' practice of contributing to both Democratic and Republi-
can candidates, 160 often in the same election, suggests their purposes
are often more instrumental than constitutive. When corporate PACs
give to both sides of an electoral contest, the PAC contributions pre-
serve access to elected officials but hardly can be said to reflect the
political self-realization of contributors.
The FECA's restricted class rules can be partially explained by a
salutary association view. Executive and administrative personnel
theoretically enjoy a more beneficial relationship with the corpora-
tion than hourly employees do. At the higher levels of the corporate
hierarchy, executives and administrators set the policies governing
the organization and determine which political causes the PAC sup-
ports. They enjoy an unusual degree of intimacy with the organiza-
tion, its people, and its goals.
Trouble arises in formulating rules to determine who has a close
enough relationship to the corporation to be considered a "member,"
and thus eligible to contribute to a corporate PAC. As then-Justice
Rehnquist phrased it, members must have "some relatively enduring
and independently significant financial or organizational attachment"
to the corporation. 161 In Federal Election Commission v. National
Right to Work Committee (NRWC), a nonstock corporation solicited
PAC contributions from 267,000 people who had previously contrib-
uted money to the organization. 162 Analogizing "members" to corpo-
rate stockholders, the Court held that these solicitees lacked a suffi-
ciently enduring relationship to the corporation, despite their prior
financial contributions. 163  Rehnquist explained that NRWC
159. See Ruth S. Jones & Warren E. Miller, Financing Campaigns: Macro
Level Innovation and Micro Level Response, 38 WEST. POL. Q. 187, 205
(1985); Frank J. Sorauf, Who's in Charge? Accountability in Political Action
Committees, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 591, 597 (1984).
160. See, e.g., Stem v. General Electric Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (shareholder plaintiffs alleged that the General Electric PAC had con-
tributed to opposing candidates in the same race).
161. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 204 (1982) (upholding the FECA's PAC solicitation rules).
162. See id. at 200.
163. See id. at 206. Section 441b(b)(4)(c) uses the term "membership or-
ganization," but Rehnquist's opinion focuses on defining "members."
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contributors were not members because they "play[ed] no part in the
operation or administration of the corporation; they elect[ed] no cor-
porate officials;" nor had they "exercise[d] any control over the ex-
penditure of their contributions."'
164
Yet those whom the FECA allows to be solicited would not
meet this standard if it were rigorously applied. With the exception
of some high-ranking executives, most salaried employees of the
modem corporation do not "operate" the organization, establish its
policies and politics, or elect its governors. Nor can passive share-
holders of a public corporation be said to exercise any meaningful
contiol over corporate activity.165 Almost none of these potential
contributors to corporate PACs have much of a say in how or where
their contributions are expended. PACs are "caucus" organiza-
tions-that is, they are led by a few individuals who decide how to
spend contributions with little or no input from the donors.
166
The NRWC Court's refusal to include past financial contributors
within the limited class of solicitable members, because they did not
have an enduring and independently significant tie analogous to
stockholders, shows how slippery these categories are. Day traders,
although they do not have an enduring relationship with the corpora-
tion, are entitled to vote as shareholders if they own on the record
date. Individual pension and mutual fund investors, even with a sig-
nificant attachment to their corporations, are often involuntary asso-
ciates of the enterprise. To allow these stockholders more room to
associate meaningfully than those who, like NRWC supporters, have
made the conscious choice to affiliate with the organization's politics
undermines the achievement of election law's constitutive goals.
Financial supporters, such as those in NRWC, are not the only
participants in the corporate enterprise that might benefit from politi-
cal association through PACs. Brand-loyal customers, suppliers,
creditors, and even neighboring communities might also find corpo-
rate association beneficial. Yet, by excluding them, the FECA's
PAC rules frustrate the achievement of meaningful corporate asso-
ciation for many potential members of the corporation.
164. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 206.
165. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 140, at 63.
166. See EIsMEIER & POLLOCK, supra note 61, at 15.
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Corporate PAC rules illustrate the ways in which both salutary
and perilous association views of the corporation interact in the same
regulatory scheme. Not only do both of these association views raise
troubling questions for election law, but their coexistence prevents
the goals of either from being achieved. Neither shareholders nor
employees receive adequate protection from management. And
many of those who might wish to pursue political ends are excluded
from participating in corporate PACs and thus are unable to achieve
meaningful, self-realization through the corporate form.
V. CONCLUSION
Election law manifests several different views of the corporation
and its place in politics. These ways of conceptualizing the corpora-
tion-in terms of political equality, as an artificial or natural entity,
or as a perilous or salutary association-each appear in election law
debates, regulations, and adjudication. Yet they often work at log-
gerheads, leaving corporate electoral regulation devoid of coherence
and consistency.
Is there one view of the corporation that should be adopted?
Perhaps, but it is unlikely that any one way of conceptualizing the
corporation will become dominant any time soon. The corporation is
a multi-faceted institution; it is at once an economic, political, and
social organization that serves many goals and purposes. Indeed, the
competing themes that echo through election law reflect a larger lack
of consensus on the corporation and its place in society. As long as
society remains uncertain of how to conceptualize the corporation,
corporate election law will continue to be patterned by stripes of
many colors.
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